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Many commentators have portrayed the tech boom of the late 1990s as an era of unprecedented
deterioration in the quality of firms undertaking initial public offerings. But as far back as the
early 1980s, firms seeking to go public were displaying signs of financial weakness, and the 
failure rate of issuers was on the rise. An analysis of the likelihood of failure among IPO firms
in 1980-2000 suggests that pre-issue profitability is a good predictor of aftermarket survival.
S
ince 1980,more than nine thousand privately
held corporations have participated in initial
public offerings (IPOs).By making their stock
available to the public,these companies have succeeded in
raising a total of $450 billion. As the numbers suggest,
firms look to IPOs as a key source of capital—capital that
can be used to expand or diversify operations,build new
facilities,and develop new technologies and products.For
investors, the IPO market has other attractions: Initial 
public offerings,though risky,present an opportunity to
invest in forward-looking firms with the potential for high
growth.
During the last few years,however,the boom-and-bust
fortunes of the technology IPO market have caused
investor sentiment toward IPOs to turn sharply negative.At
the height of the dot-com craze in 1999-2000,the average
first-day return on IPOs shot up to a staggering 65 per-
cent.1 The market euphoria was short-lived,however,as
investors suffered huge losses with the decline or failure of
the high-tech companies. In reaction to these develop-
ments,the flow of new IPO issues slowed dramatically in
2002 and the first half of 2003,and the number of with-
drawn offerings soared.Although issuance picked up in the
latter half of 2003,IPO activity remains well below the high
levels reached in earlier years.
Many industry analysts have attributed the technology
IPO debacle of 2001-03 to the deteriorating quality of busi-
nesses that decided to “go public.”In this view,enormous
numbers of speculative firms entered the public markets in
the late 1990s with poor business plans and little or no
foreseeable earnings.2
In this edition of Current Issues,we take a longer view of
the IPO market by evaluating the fundamentals of firms
that went public over the two-decade period from 1980 to
2000.Our analysis reveals a striking decline in the pre-IPO
financial condition of issuers that was discernible as far
back as the early 1980s.Consistent with the deteriorating
financial performance of the IPO firms,we also document
a significant rise during this period in the failure rate of
issuers after the offering.Other factors being equal,firms
with negative pre-IPO earnings were three times more
likely to be dropped from an exchange than were profitable
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an extended period suggests that weak financial perfor-
mance by private firms seeking to go public may be a very
telling signal of aftermarket failure.
Overview of IPO Activity,1980-2000
IPO activity increased markedly in the 1990s from its levels
in the preceding decade.A brief look at issuance for the full
sample of IPO companies—excluding specialized fund
issues such as closed-end funds, foreign issues traded as
American depository receipts,real estate investment trusts,
and unit trusts—shows that the aggregate nominal value of
IPO proceeds was considerably higher in the 1990s than in
the 1980s, and especially high during the Internet boom
period of 1999-2000 (Table 1).The upsurge in the volume of
gross proceeds in this decade was also significant in real,or
inflation-adjusted,terms (for instance,when adjusted by the
consumer price index deflator). As a percentage of total 
stock market capitalization,the volume of IPO proceeds also
grew, albeit more slowly. The amount of funds raised by 
issuing companies during the 1980s and 1990s averaged
0.296 percent and 0.364 percent, respectively, of the total
stock market capitalization.
The Financial Condition of Offering Firms 
Before They Go Public
While the statistics on issuance attest to the rising popular-
ity of IPOs over the last two decades,they tell us very little
about the quality of companies seeking equity financing.To
analyze the financial soundness of issuing companies before
the offering,we employ two widely used accounting mea-
sures. First, we estimate firm profitability based on the
return on assets,defined as net income after taxes divided by
total assets.3 The top panel of Chart 1 plots this profitability
measure from 1980 to 2000.4Offering firms (solid line) show
a marked deterioration in profitability in the 1990s.By con-
trast,a control sample of nonissuing firms (dashed line),
comparable in size and valuation to the issuing firms,5
exhibit a much more stable pattern of profitability during
the twenty-year period. The consistently positive perfor-
mance of these “peer”firms over these years suggests that
the dramatic deterioration in the financial strength of IPO
firms cannot be attributed to weaker or changing economic
conditions.




Total IPO Issuance Percentage of
Year Number of IPOs (Millions of Dollars) Total Market
1980 147 1,315 0.077
1981 347 3,055 0.212
1982 121 1,331 0.080
1983 675 12,192 0.636
1984 344 3,124 0.172
1985 329 6,255 0.276
1986 691 17,198 0.675
1987 507 13,012 0.510
1988 215 4,445 0.160
1989 205 5,509 0.164
1980-89 3,581 67,436 0.296
1990 171 4,389 0.145
1991 361 15,494 0.382
1992 498 21,290 0.478
1993 632 29,645 0.576
1994 532 17,277 0.339
1995 545 26,329 0.383
1996 817 41,606 0.493
1997 564 32,413 0.295
1998 347 32,295 0.239
1999 496 54,272 0.310
1990-99 4,963 275,010 0.364
2000 374 51,701 0.325
2001 91 32,045 0.226
2002 86 23,202 0.206
1980-2002 9,095 449,394 0.320
Source:Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC).
Note:The IPO sample excludes closed-end funds,American depository receipts,real
estate investment trusts,and unit trusts.
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Our second important indicator of financial soundness
is capitalization,or net worth,defined as total assets minus
total liabilities. The bottom panel of Chart 1 traces the
equity-to-assets ratios of issuers and their nonissuing peers
from 1980 to 2000.6 Consistent with our previous finding,
the chart shows that the financial net worth of issuing 
companies declined dramatically, while the net worth of
nonissuing firms maintained a steady level.Moreover,the
gradual but widening gap in performance between offering
companies and their peers appears to have originated as far
back as the early 1980s.
Accounting for the Decline
One possible explanation for the deteriorating financial 
performance of issuers from 1980 to 2000 is the apparent
structural change in the character of the firms going public.
The proliferation of younger and more speculative issuers 
in the 1990s may in some measure be responsible for the
financial underperformance of IPO firms.The number of
high-growth technology and Internet offerings exploded in
the 1990s as breakthroughs in personal computing,software
development,and communications and networking spurred
the formation of new, highly innovative companies. The
emergence of these speculative firms may have weighed
down the financial performance of issuers as a group.
Indeed, a look at the financial strength of technology 
and Internet IPOs over the entire period reveals an unam-
biguous pattern of deterioration (Table 2,panel A).During
the 1980-84 period,these firms earned a healthy $0.77 per
share.In the 1995-2000 period,however,they lost $1.17 per
share on average. Within this group, the Internet firms 
performed particularly poorly, averaging a loss of $3 per
share before going public.7
While the financial weakness of the tech firms probably
accounts for much of the pre-issue decline of IPO firms,our
findings suggest that nontechnology firms—“other” in
panel A of Table 2—lost significant strength as well.In fact,
the profitability and net worth measures for all firms began
to drop in the late 1980s,long before the onset of the high-
tech boom.
A look at the exchanges on which the IPO firms’securities
were traded also sheds some light on the firms’ decline
(Table 2,panel B).Roughly 73 percent of the offering firms
were listed on the NASDAQ (National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation) market. Small
firms prefer NASDAQ because of lower minimum listing
requirements,lower initial and annual fees,and other insti-
tutional features.Moreover,throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
many technology IPO companies were drawn to NASDAQ
because of its unique structure of market makers.The belief
was that market makers expert in the technology sector
could best represent new tech and Internet issuers,increas-
ing the visibility of these companies and providing liquidity
for their stock (Corwin and Harris 2001).
The emergence of NASDAQ in the 1970s clearly broad-
ened the pool of companies eligible to issue equity to include
many more small and speculative new firms.Because of the
greater riskiness of these firms,the deterioration in financial
performance in the 1980-2000 period was especially sharp
for firms listed on NASDAQ.Nevertheless,it is significant
that firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
Table 2
Pre-IPO Financial Performance,1980-2000
A.Tech-Internet Firm B.Exchange C.Underwriter D.Venture-Capital-Backed
Period Yes Other NYSE AMEX NASDAQ Top-Tier Other Yes No
Profitability:Earnings per Share (Dollars)
1980-84 0.77 1.29 1.83 1.23 1.11 1.37 1.09 0.78 1.42
1985-89 0.59 1.01 1.43 1.17 0.84 1.17 0.81 0.72 1.08
1990-94 -0.01 0.32 0.70 -0.10 0.20 0.45 0.20 -0.12 0.59
1995-2000 -1.17 -0.45 0.27 -0.01 -1.08 -1.21 -0.57 -1.94 -0.04
Net Worth:Common Equity-to-Assets Ratio (Percent)
1980-84 38.35 37.81 37.64 38.70 37.87 37.48 37.53 40.62 36.50
1985-89 39.29 27.75 28.08 27.21 29.30 29.24 28.62 27.12 29.72
1990-94 17.46 17.05 20.74 22.29 15.84 17.44 16.90 9.14 22.87
1995-2000 -10.65 9.28 24.58 19.66 -1.74 1.37 4.00 18.88 18.73
Source:Thomson Financial Securities Data Corporation (SDC).
Note:The group of top-tier underwriters is defined in note 8.also suffered a significant decline in profitability during this
two-decade period, with earnings per share falling from
$1.83 in the early 1980s to $0.27 in the late 1990s.
We note, too, that the deterioration in quality has been 
similar in firms whose securities have been brought to market
by large,or top-tier,underwriters and firms whose securities
have been brought to market by small underwriters (Table 2,
panel C).8 Before the 1980s, top-tier underwriters rarely
advised small,unprofitable firms.However,as smaller firms
began to dominate the pool of eligible issuers,large under-
writers had to adapt their standards to accommodate them.
Venture capital investors also had to choose from among
riskier start-up companies as the period progressed.
Nevertheless, IPO firms backed by venture capital have
always been more speculative than more established firms
that generally did not need such funding (Table 2,panel D).
After all,the role of venture capitalists is to invest in projects
whose potential for high growth is offset by high risk.
The Aftermarket Survival of IPO Firms
We have documented a striking decline in the pre-issue 
financial condition of firms that undertook an IPO in the
1980-2000 period. How did these firms fare after going
public?
In theory,of course,a number of outcomes are possible.
Once a firm has made its stock available to the public,it may
continue operating as a viable concern,trading on one of the
major stock exchanges.It may also be acquired by another
firm,choose to go private again,or liquidate.In the worst-
case scenario,a company may be delisted—that is,dropped
from the exchange on which its securities are traded—
because of poor performance.9
We track the percentage of public firms that experienced a
negative-performance delisting during 1980-2001 (Chart 2).
The bars in the chart capture the failure rate among all firms
that went public.The lower portion of each bar (shown in
blue) represents the failure rate among the subset of firms
that went public during the five years preceding the date of
delisting shown at the bottom of the bar.
As the chart indicates,delistings climbed gradually over
the sample period,reaching a high in 2001 when an unprece-
dented 600 IPO firms—accounting for 3.8 percent of all
publicly traded stocks—were dropped by the major stock
exchanges.Driving this result were delistings by firms that
had gone public in the five preceding years: indeed, this
group of relatively recent issuers (blue portion of the bars)
accounted for an average 68 percent of the delistings.10
In addition to highlighting both the broad rise in IPO fail-
ures and the tendency of IPO delistings to occur within a few
years of issuance,the chart underscores the cyclical behavior
of the firm failures. The surge in IPO failures during the
recessions of 1990-91 and 2001 indicates that unfavorable
macroeconomic conditions can contribute to the failure of
IPO firms.In particular,an unanticipated economic slow-
down can be detrimental to companies with weak financial
balance sheets.Similarly,industry-specific factors can help
bring about the failure of firms. For example, increasing
competition in an industry can lead to the loss of important
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Source: Center for Research in Security Prices.
Chart 2
Delisted IPO Firms as a Percentage of All Public Firms, 1980-2001
Quarterly Data
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IPO issuers in the five years preceding the year of delisting
Year of delisting
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customers and a drop in market share.Thus,IPO firms,like
more established companies,need to avoid poor managerial
decisions and other strategic missteps if they are to survive
and prosper.
How Well Does Pre-IPO Performance Predict
Aftermarket Survival?
We have seen that the sharp decline in pre-IPO fundamen-
tals over the 1980-2000 period coincided broadly with a rise
in the incidence of delisting.Together,these developments
suggest that for many firms,the seeds of failure may have
been planted before the decision to go public was made.
Specifically,it appears likely that the financial weakness of
issuing firms may have hampered their ability to compete
and survive in the public market.
In this section,we test this hypothesis by investigating
whether the financial condition of IPO firms before the
offering can predict their ultimate success and survival in
the public market.To some,this relationship is a given—bad
firms fail after all.To others,especially investors who bought
dot-com shares in the secondary market at exorbitant prices,
it may be an unpleasant reminder that they may have over-
looked many conspicuous warning signals. Often these
symptoms of financial weakness are discernible from IPO
prospectuses that report a company’s current financial state
as well as its business plan and revenue potential.
To estimate the relationship between a firm’s pre-IPO per-
formance and its ability to survive in the aftermarket,we
employ a cross-sectional hazard regression model. To be
sure,a firm’s survival is most accurately ascertained from its
post-issue financial condition.Our goal here,however,is to
determine if one can predict the long-run survival of an
issuer by using only that information that would be available
to an investor prior to the offering.11
In the cross-sectional hazard regression,the dependent
variable is the conditional probability that the IPO firm will
fail (that is,delist) given that it has not failed until that point
in time.The explanatory variable is a measure of the pre-
issue financial condition of the IPO firm.In line with our
earlier analysis,we use the firm’s return on assets to gauge its
financial strength. The regression also includes exchange
dummy indicators (NYSE,NASDAQ,or AMEX) to control for
the impact of heterogeneous listing requirements.
Our regression analysis reveals a strong and statistically
significant negative relationship between the probability 
of delisting and a firm’s pre-issue return on assets.To illus-
trate this relationship,we use a simple graphical approach
that maps the survival of IPO firms for different levels of
pre-issue profitability (Chart 3). The middle curve in the
chart represents the experience of the average-profit com-
pany,one with a slightly negative return on assets.The top
and bottom curves plot the survival of issuers ranked at the
95th and 5th percentiles of profitability, respectively. The
considerable disparity in performance between the high-
profit and low-profit groups (about 13 percentage points
after seven years) indicates that pre-IPO profitability is,by
itself,a very strong indicator of the ability of firms to operate
successfully after the offering.
We then repeat the analysis using alternative explanatory
variables—first,the age of the company at the time of the
offering and,second,the extent of insider ownership.Like
firms’return on assets,these variables are discernible from
the IPO prospectus. And although they are firm or deal 
characteristics rather than measures of pre-IPO financial
performance,both are likely to have some power to predict
aftermarket survival.
Company age,measured by subtracting the year the com-
pany was founded from the year it went public,appears to be
a good proxy for financial riskiness.Ritter (1991) shows that
younger issuing companies underperform their more estab-
lished peers. The mean age of new listed companies
remained fairly stable until the late 1990s,hovering around
seven years.With the dot-com explosion of the late 1990s,
however,the average age of an issuing firm dropped to four
years.The failure rate among these speculative companies
that rushed to go public appears to have been very high.
Indeed, our calculations confirm that firm age is a fairly
good predictor of aftermarket survival (Table 3,panel B).
As for insider ownership,a number of academic studies
point to a relationship between the structure of an IPO deal
and the post-issue performance of the firm.In their seminal
paper,Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that in firms where
Chart 3
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(5th percentile)insiders—owners and managers—hold a relatively small
fraction of the company stock,the interests of management
will not be aligned with those of the shareholders; thus,
managers are less likely to undertake projects that would
enhance the value of the firm and more likely to seek
rewards in the form of perks and other nonpecuniary 
benefits. Jain and Kini (1994) find that IPO firms whose
management retains a high level of ownership at the time of
transition from private to public enterprise exhibit stronger
operating performance after the offering.Consistent with
the findings of these studies,our analysis shows that a high
level of stock retention by insiders increases an IPO firm’s
survival rate in the public market (Table 3,panel C).
Firm and deal characteristics clearly can shed light on the
likelihood of an IPO firm’s survival.Nevertheless,pre-issue
profitability and similar measures of performance emerge in
our analysis as the best predictors by far.A simple way to
illustrate the importance of pre-issue performance is to
compute the hazard ratio,which compares the probability of
delisting for unprofitable and profitable issuers.The hazard
ratio in the 1990s is roughly 3, meaning that, with other 
factors held constant,investors who bet on more specula-
tive,money-losing IPO firms faced a risk of delisting that
was roughly three times greater than that faced by investors
in profitable firms.
Conclusion
Stock market participants are still recovering from the high-
tech collapse that erased several trillions of dollars of market
capitalization and brought massive layoffs and record num-
bers of business failures to the technology sector.It is hardly
surprising that the IPO process that facilitated most of the
speculative issues has come under intense scrutiny.In this
article,we document a gradual but significant deterioration
in pre-IPO financial performance over the 1980-2000 period
and a corresponding rise in the failure rate offirms following
their entry in the public market.Using a hazard regression
model,we show that pre-IPO profitability and related mea-
sures are very good predictors of a firm’s ability to survive in
the aftermarket.
Our analysis serves as a reminder that a viable and well-
functioning IPO market must on the whole be based on 
companies with sound fundamentals and strong business
plans.It is reasonable,of course,for investors to embrace a
wide range of IPOs across the whole spectrum of risk.But in
the 1990s,the majority of companies that went public were
unprofitable, with the result that investing in speculative
firms became the rule rather than the exception.
However, the average profit level of IPO firms has
improved in the last two years.The mean return-on-assets
ratio for issuers rose from -42 percent in 2000 to -6 percent
in 2001-02.Over the first three quarters of 2003,IPO firms
achieved a positive 3.9 percent return on assets.This upturn
in profitability provides some evidence that market partici-
pants have begun to underwrite and invest in financially
stronger companies.
Notes
1. The underpricing of IPOs—evident in the difference between the offer price
and the first-day closing price—appears to be inconsistent with efficient market
theories (see Ritter [2002]). Several studies have documented a persistent
underpricing in both domestic and foreign IPOs. A recent review paper by 
Welch and Ritter (2002) finds that the first-day return for new issues during the
periods 1980-89 and 1990-2000 was 7.4 and 15.2 percent, respectively.
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Table 3
Firm Characteristics and the Likelihood of Survival,1980-2000
A.Capitalization B.Age at IPO C.Level of Insider Ownership
Years after Average 95th 5th Average 95th 5th Average 95th 5th
IPO Firm Percentile Percentile Firm Percentile Percentile Firm Percentile Percentile
1 0.974 0.978 0.965 0.973 0.980 0.969 0.980 0.982 0.978
2 0.935 0.944 0.913 0.934 0.950 0.924 0.945 0.950 0.938
3 0.890 0.905 0.853 0.888 0.916 0.873 0.905 0.914 0.893
4 0.848 0.869 0.800 0.843 0.880 0.822 0.862 0.874 0.845
5 0.817 0.841 0.759 0.807 0.853 0.782 0.833 0.848 0.814
6 0.780 0.808 0.713 0.767 0.821 0.738 0.796 0.814 0.773
7 0.744 0.776 0.669 0.733 0.793 0.699 0.765 0.785 0.739
Source:Authors’calculations.
Notes:The likelihood of survival is the probability that the IPO firm will still be trading on a major stock exchange after nyears (n = 1,...,7).A firm’s capitalization is calculated
as net worth divided by total assets.The age at IPO is calculated as the difference in years between the firm’s establishment date and the date of the offering.The level of insider
ownership is the percentage of shares retained by firm owners and managers after the offering.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 7
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2. See,for example,Nelson D.Schwartz,“The Ugly Truth about IPOs,”Fortune,
November 23,1998; Mike Tarsala,“The IPO Market Is as Sleazy as Ever,”CBS
MarketWatch.com,September 18,2002; and Amy Schiffrin,“When IPOs Get
Called Off,”Newsweek,October 16,2000.
3. The return on equity is often considered to be a more accurate measure of
firm profitability.Unfortunately,the return on equity is undefined for many
issuing firms that have negative worth prior to going public.Net income (or
loss) is defined as total revenues and gains in the quarter minus expenses
(including extraordinary items and discontinued operations but excluding
interest expenses).To obtain a more representative measure of the earning
capacity across all firms with and without debt,we excluded interest costs
from total expenses.We also considered several other profitability measures
such as pretax return on operating assets and pretax return on total earning
assets.Overall,our findings were very similar for all of the different financial
ratios.
4. All pre-IPO financial ratios represent the average performance of the firm
up to eight quarters before going public.To be included in the sample,an IPO
firm must have at least two quarters of reported financial information in
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database.Chart 1 tracks the equally weighted
average performance of issuers by year.We eliminated a handful of outliers
from the data to guarantee consistency over time.
5. More precisely,the nonissuing firms in the control sample are similar to the
issuing firms in market capitalization (size) and the ratio of market value to
book value in the first month following the issuing firms’ IPO date. To be
included in the control sample,a firm must have traded for at least five years
before the IPO date without offering any secondary shares to the market.
6. Common equity consists of common stock outstanding (including Treasury
stock adjustments),capital surplus,and retained earnings.
7. The IPO sample includes 463 Internet-related firms that issued stock 
primarily in the late 1990s.
8. We used market shares and the Carter-Manaster rank scores to identify top-
tier underwriters in each decade (Carter and Manaster 1990).For the 1990s,
this group comprises Goldman Sachs,Merrill Lynch,Morgan Stanley,Deutsche
Bank/Bankers Trust/Alex.Brown,Credit Suisse First Boston,Smith Barney,
First Boston Corporation,Lehman Brothers,Salomon Brothers/Salomon Smith
Barney, Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, Chase Hambrecht & Quist, and JP
Morgan Securities.In the 1980s,the top underwriters were Merrill Lynch,
Shearson Loeb Rhoades,Goldman Sachs,Alex.Brown,Paine Webber,Morgan
Stanley,Kidder Peabody,E.F.Hutton,L.F.Rothschild,Prudential Bache,Lehman
Brothers,Salomon Brothers,First Boston,and Drexel Burnham Lambert.
9. A performance delisting occurs when the firm fails to meet one or more of
the required minimum listing requirements.For example,a firm may cease
trading if it has insufficient capital,or if its stock price falls below a specified
level.Often,negative-performance delistings are preceded or closely followed
by bankruptcy filings or regulatory actions that result in formal closure.
Securities relegated to secondary exchanges (for example, the over-the-
counter Bulletin Board,or OTCBB) often end up being delisted again,or they
decline into penny stocks.The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
uses a variety of codes to identify performance-related delistings.We adjusted
the CRSP data by using information from Bloomberg Financial.Furthermore,
we used Bloomberg information to verify the final status of every delisted
firm.In the end,a security was considered a failure and kept in the delisting
sample if it had resulted in a huge loss to shareholders (that is,the median last
quoted price for a delisted firm was less than one cent per share).
10. The delisting rate for new issues peaks about four to five years after the IPO.
11. Peristiani (2003) estimates a more rigorous cross-sectional time-series
model comparing the aftermarket survival of IPO and non-IPO firms.
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